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Τρίτη 29 Μαΐου 2012

Cyprus can become a gas storage hub for the EU, says government



The energy sector in Cyprus, in relation to both domestic and global developments, is at a critical juncture, Under Secretary to the President Titos Christofides said in a speech on behalf of President Demetris Christofias at the Energy Gas Storage Summit 2012 in Prague.
Christofides noted that the strategic position of Cyprus in the Mediterranean Sea, in conjunction with the recent gas discoveries in the region and plans for their export, could promote the island as an alternative and fully flexible gas (LNG) storage hub for the European Union and the rest of the world.
According to Christofides, the recent discovery of substantial quantities of natural gas within the Exclusive Economic Zone of Cyprus, in combination with the potential utilization of other gas deposits and future gas findings in the area, opens up new prospects and gives a large new impetus to the role of Cyprus in the global energy map and the European energy market.
The total amounts of natural gas reserves of the Eastern Mediterranean basin, estimated at 120-150 trillion cubic feet, comprise a significant reserve which could satisfy the energy demand of the EU for a long time, he pointed out, noting that Cyprus reserves are situated at only 500 Kilometers away from the southern part of continental Europe.
Christofides said that the Republic of Cyprus is now entering the economic and technological fields of energy resources exploration for the very first time in its history. As a consequence, it needs to create all necessary institutional, legal, operational, technological, and construction facilities from scratch, based only on its existing, efficient and tested institutions which have contributed to the successful economic growth of our country during the last few decades, he added.
Cyprus, he continued, is also dependent on the experiences and models of management of natural energy resources, of countries such as Norway, Holland as well as others. The delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic of Cyprus by itself also encompasses an act of self-fortification and self reassurance of our non- negotiable sovereign rights, he noted.
As he said the announcement made by Noble Energy International in December 2011 regarding the discovery of significant reserves of natural gas in block 12 (also known as the Aphrodite block), in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic of Cyprus, of some 5-8 trillion cubic feet, has placed Cyprus on the energy resources map of the world.
”Based on this discovery, we have proceeded in opening a second round of licensing for the remaining twelve out of thirteen available blocks. The deadline for the proclamation of interest regarding this second round of licensing procedure, expired on the eleventh of May, a date within the ninety days period, specified by the relevant directives of the European Union. The interest shown by medium to large enterprises was, by all accounts, beyond our expectations,” he noted.
He added that in the context of the development of indigenous natural gas deposits, the possibility of installing a sub-sea pipeline for the transportation of natural gas in Cyprus, so that it can then be distributed for domestic use, is of utmost importance and is currently under examination.
”Additionally, we are currently evaluating the potential establishment of the necessary infrastructure for liquefying the natural gas for export. A gas liquefaction plant in Cyprus can constitute the necessary regional energy infrastructure that may contribute to the diversification of supply sources and the security of energy supply, since it could serve as a flexible hub/interface for the large quantities of natural gas located in the greater Eastern Mediterranean Sea also known as the Levantine basin,” he said.
Recently fifteen bids from five companies and 10 from joint ventures were submitted for the second licensing round concerning the Republic of Cyprus’ offshore hydrocarbon reserves.
Bids were submitted for 9 of the 12 offshore blocks, comprising the Cypriot Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).
Cyprus has signed an agreement to delineate the Exclusive Economic Zone with Egypt and Israel with a view to exploit any possible natural gas and oil reserves in its EEZ. A similar agreement has been signed with Lebanon but the Lebanese Parliament has not yet ratified it.
The first licensing round, concluded in 2007, resulted in granting concessions to Houston-based “Noble Energy” for exploratory drilling in Cyprus’ EEZ block 12. Noble started drilling in September 2011.
The government approved on November 23, 2011 the launch of a second licensing round for the remaining 12 offshore blocks.

Tensions rise as Cyprus protests to UN over Turkish airspace violations



UN Ambassador Nicholas Emiliou has denounced new Turkish violations of Cyprus national airspace between 1 and 31 March 2012.
The Permanent Representative expressed the Republic’s strong protest calling Turkey to stop these activities immediately.
“Such systematic violations against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus are contrary to international law and international rules of the air and pose a serious threat to international aviation in the region”, he notes.
Emiliou also stresses that Turkey’s actions are especially worrisome, in light of recent military threats by Turkey against Cyprus, related with activities in Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone, as well as threats of high-ranking Turkish officials to annex the Turkish-occupied part of Cyprus to Turkey.
“Instead of using threats”, he said, “Turkey should respond to the call of the international community and demonstrate a constructive spirit, creating the necessary conditions for achieving a sustainable solution to the Cyprus problem on the basis agreed and adopted by Security Council resolutions”.
TENSIONS
Last week Turkey said it had scrambled military jets to intercept an Israeli plane that violated “northern Cypriot airspace” and demanded an explanation for the incursion.
An Israeli military spokesman declined to comment on the accusation. But the incident marked a fresh source of tension between the former allies.

Proposals by a French expert regarding the delineation of territorial waters, continental shelf and EEZ in the Aegean Sea



Sometimes it is useful beyond the standard Greek positions on national issues, to also explore what is being discussed away from the spotilight. So we present today, the article of the French diplomat and expert in maritime affairs, Didier Ortolland entitled “The Greek-Turkish dispute over the Aegean Sea: a possible solution?” Originally published in the French magazine “Défense nationale et sécurité collective” and then in www.diploweb.com, where we found it.
To avoid misunderstandings, we should make clear that we do not adopt the article, nor the accompanying map. It is however very interesting to look at the proposals of the French expert, that shows a “compromise” between Greek and Turkish positions because such a “compromise” seems to have been discussed, at least until April 2011, under the so-called “exploratory talks” between Greece and Turkey. These talks began by then Greek Foreign Minister G. Papandreou in 1999 – and apparently they were not only “exploratory” since after the April 2011 had reached the fiftieth round … Recall that the Turkish diplomat Denis Bouloukbasi who was involved in these “exploratory” contacts until the 36th round, has published a book entitled “The staircase of the Foreign Ministry” in which he claims that part of the agreement was the withdrawal of Greece from the extension of its territorial waters in specific regions of the Aegean, just like the proposal of D. Ortolland … This claim by Bouloukbasi was denied by some close associates of G. Papandreou like P. Beglitis and S. Lambrinidis, but given the veil of secrecy surrounding these contacts, everyone can believe what he wants. Also note that D. Koumoutsakos the Greek Foreign Ministry spokesman stated in 2004 that the then new government of New Democracy “froze” the Greek-Turkish agreement that was “in the making” by the previous government, while the former Greek Prime minister Mr. Simitis has written that in 2004 his government was very close to a Greek-Turkish agreement.
Again to avoid misunderstandings, we do not claim that the article of D. Ortolland captures the theme of Greek-Turkish talks, or that the agreement reported by Costas Simitis and D. Koumoutsakos has this form. But it is known that at least the Greek side (and probably the Turkish side as well) has sought the views of international experts, so it is likely that some points reflect the thematic knowledge of Greek-Turkish talks.
Here is the article by D. Ortolland and the detailed map that comes with it.
* Didier Ortolland is Coordinator of the Geopolitical Atlas of Maritime Spaces ; he writes here in a personal capacity
The evolution of the Law of the Sea, which gives countries new spaces of sovereignty and areas of jurisdiction without specifying their delimitation, is the source of the dispute between Greece and Turkey in the Aegean Sea. This article sets out possible solutions for the delimitation of territorial waters, the continental shelf and exclusive economic zones with reference to the established related jurisprudence and the practice of the states, while taking into consideration the equity and security requirements of both countries.
As part of its strategy of geopolitical synergy, www.diploweb.com is pleased to present this article, which first appeared in Défense nationale et sécurité collective, February 2009, pp. 74-87.
IN THE course of the last 40 years, Greece and Turkey have found themselves on the brink of war because of their basic opposition concerning the exercise of sovereignty on the waters of the Aegean Sea. Historical factors weigh heavily : Turkey lost most of its European territories in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (see map), while Greece maintained cultural hegemony over the area as well as the shoreline of Anatolia since ancient times : Constantinople fell into the hands of the Ottomans five centuries earlier (1453) but the Greek populations remained until recently on the eastern bank of the Aegean Sea. The Treaty of Lausanne dated 24 July 1923 led to the flight of 1.3 million Greeks from the regions of Smyrna and Eastern Thrace, and of 400,000 Muslims who left Western Thrace to settle in Turkey. There are two opposing historical realities coupled with resentment.
The territorial division resulting from the Treaty of Lausanne [1]and the Treaty of Paris of 10 February 1947 [2]seemed relatively stable ; Greece logically had almost all of the islands of the Aegean Sea, populated by Greeks since ancient times. However, the evolution of international law, following the Second World War, and particularly after 1958, [3] has hampered the status quo.
In effect, the Greek islands are scattered all over the Aegean Sea, reaching the coast of Turkey ; particularly in the case of Lesbos, Chios, Kos, Rhodes and Samos. Some smaller islands are even closer, such as Megisti (Castellorizo) located towards the south-east only 1,300 m from the Turkish coast. This situation has become very complicated with the evolution of the Law of the Sea.
The Law of the Sea and the Greco-Turkish dispute
The evolution of the Law of the Sea is at the source of the Greco-Turkish dispute in the Aegean Sea. The exercise of sovereignty of the coastal states on the waters situated beyond their territory has been accepted since the eighteenth century ; this territorial sea was at the time limited to 3 nautical miles (n miles). With technological progress, the states felt the need to enlarge their waters to ensure security and to exploit the marine and subsoil resources. This extension of areas under sovereignty (territorial waters) and under jurisdiction (continental shelf and exclusive economic zone) is the source of many disputes, including those of the Aegean Sea. Due to the difference between states giving greater importance to free navigation and those concerned foremost about their security or the exploitation of marine resources beyond their territory, the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone said nothing about the maximum breadth of the territorial waters. Some countries have meanwhile decided to extend it to 12 n miles ; it has been the case for France since 1971. The exploitation of hydrocarbons of the continental shelf, beyond territorial waters, developed rapidly. The Convention on the Continental Shelf of 29 April 1958 recognized this right. Finally, the concept of exclusive economic zone (EEZ) which allows the exercise of jurisdiction over 200 n miles was to be acknowledged by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea concluded at Montego Bay in December 1982. Many countries did not wait for the signing of the Convention to establish EEZs beforehand ; France did so in 1976. These developments disturbed the relative stability of the Aegean Sea respected since the end of the Second World War and raised a controversy regarding territorial waters and the continental shelf.
Territorial waters
Greece has extended its territorial waters to 6 n miles by an Act of September 1936. Greek territorial waters thus cover 43.5 per cent of the Aegean Sea while Turkish territorial waters represent only 7.5 per cent. If the territorial waters of the two countries were brought to 12 n miles, 71.5 per cent of the Aegean Sea would be under Greek sovereignty and 8.7 per cent Turkish. The area of high sea would be reduced from 49 per cent to 19.7 per cent. If the two countries established EEZs, the remaining space (19.7 per cent) would fall entirely under the jurisdiction of Athens. [4] This explains why Turkey has always exerted pressure on its neighbour, claiming that the enlargement of Greek territorial waters to 12 n miles would represent a casus belli. The Turkish Parliament endorsed this stance with a resolution adopted in June 1995, shortly after Greece’s ratification of the Montego Bay Convention. The difficulty arises from the fact that, under the Convention, ‘ships of all States, whether coastal or land-locked, enjoy right of innocent passage’ in the territorial waters of another state. This right involves restrictions for military vessels and submarines (which are required to navigate on the surface) and could be regulated by the coastal state. If the Greek territorial waters were extended to 12 n miles in the Aegean Sea, Turkish warships coming from the Bosporus or from Izmir would be subject to the limitations of the ‘right of innocent passage’ or even to regulations adopted by Athens to link the central Mediterranean Sea.
The continental shelf
In November 1973, the Turkish government allotted fuel research zones to the Turkish State Petroleum Company in the area located between the Greek islands of Lesbos, Skiros, Limnos and west of Samothrace. In July 1974, it further issued new permits extending this zone to the West and claimed a new narrow portion of the continental shelf located between the Greek islands of the Dodecanese and the Cyclades. Greece strongly protested against these two decisions. Turkey nevertheless sent oceanographic vessels to the contested area : the Candarli in May-June 1974, and also the Sismik I, in August 1976, whose mission brought the two countries to the brink of armed conflict. Their positions could then be summarized as follows :
. For Greece, international law, and specially the Convention on the Continental Shelf, gives the islands the right to exercise jurisdiction on their continental shelf and specifies that the continental shelf between two countries must be defined on a median line basis. [5] Thus, each of the islands of the Aegean Sea has its continental shelf, and the frontiers with Turkey should be defined on the basis of the median line.
. For Turkey, the Greek islands do not have rights to exert jurisdiction on the continental shelf, as they are located on the Turkish continental shelf. The ‘special circumstances’ mentioned by the Convention on the Continental Shelf (Art. 6.2) justify in this case the non-application of the median line method.
Noting that the different positions were leading nowhere, Greece submitted the controversy to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in August 1976 but Turkey refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the Court, which in the end declared itself incompetent. [6] Since then, the maritime issue has remained and has been aggravated by territorial arguments. [7] International law has, however, evolved, affecting the position of the countries and adding to the controversy. The Montego Bay Convention reinforced the position of Greece in specifying that the coastal states could extend the area of their territorial waters to 12 n miles, while strengthening the Turkish position by removing any reference to the median line in the delimitation of the continental shelf. In effect, according to the Convention, the delimitation of the territorial waters as well as the EEZ ‘shall be effected by agreement, on the basis of international law . . . in order to achieve an equitable solution.’ (Arts. 74 and 83) Turkey is one of the rare states that have refused to sign the Convention because it refuses the possibility of extending the width of territorial waters to 12 n miles. The Convention cannot therefore be applied to Turkey, in theory, but jurisprudence tends more and more to consider that its principal provisions belong nevertheless to customary law.
Jurisprudence and maritime spaces
Jurisprudence fills the gaps in the Law of the Sea Convention on the delimitation of maritime spaces. The silence of the Convention on the methods of delimiting maritime spaces has been progressively covered by the jurisprudence of the ICJ, which has established applicable principles ; the Court has thus defined the notions of equidistance/special circumstances for the delimitation of the territorial sea, and of equitable principles/pertinent circumstances for the continental shelf and the EEZ, which involves—to simplify matters—tracing a provisional median line to check if the result is equitable. Considering the many special circumstances presented by the Aegean Sea, one may suppose that the result in this case would not be equitable. Several decisions regarding contentious cases highlight useful guidelines for the delimitation of the maritime spaces. [8]
. The decision of February 1969 on the continental shelf of the North Sea underlines the right of each state to benefit from the entire continental shelf which ‘represents the natural extension of its territory under the sea’. It has also specified that there should be a reasonable relation between the extent of the zones belonging to each state and the length of its shoreline (proportionality criterion).
. The decision of June 1977 on the continental shelf of the English Channel and the Channel Islands specified that the principle of the natural extension of territory did not have an absolute value and could be restricted in particular circumstances, which resulted in limiting the maritime space of the Channel Islands to 12 n miles embedded within the French continental shelf.
. The decision of June 1993 regarding the maritime delimitation between Greenland and the Norwegian island of Jan Mayen specified that a substantial disproportion between the length of the coast and the allotted maritime surface justifies a correction of the equidistance method.
The applicable law and jurisprudence developed in recent years may thus determine the main principles in delimiting the maritime space of the Aegean Sea, while taking into consideration the fundamental concerns of the two states (equity, security).
The delimitation of territorial waters
The Montego Bay Convention stipulates that ‘every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 n miles. . .’ If international law does not impose a restriction to this rule, some states have meanwhile decided to limit the breadth of their territorial waters to allow a high sea passage between their territorial waters : Japan has voluntarily limited its territorial sea to 3 n miles to avoid territorializing its straits ; the same goes for Estonia and Finland to allow the Russian fleet access to St Petersburg within international waters without having to transit through territorial waters of its neighbours, [9] thus avoiding the regime of ‘innocent passage’. Given a territorial sea limited to 6 n miles, Turkey actually has access to the Turkish straits from the Mediterranean through international waters ; the port of Izmir is likewise accessible without passing through Greek waters. With the extension of the territorial waters to 12 n miles, the territorial waters of the Cyclades and the Dodecanese would be connected, and Turkey would be obliged to pass through Greek waters to reach Istanbul. However, a narrow zone of high seas remains between Chios and Lesbos to reach Izmir.
A possible delemitation of Aegean waters (click to enlarge)
A solution to the dispute in the Aegean Sea could be based on the voluntary restriction by Greece of the breadth of its territorial waters in areas sensitive for navigation (in particular between the Cyclades and the Dodecanese, between Lesbos and Chios, between Antipsara and Kalogeri, and between Rhodes and Karpathos) in order to maintain a high sea corridor of 3 to 5 n miles wide, whose use could be regulated for commercial ships [10]and totally free for military vessels. In all other areas, Greece may extend its territorial waters to 12 n miles. [11] There are overlapping cases when coasts are adjacent or are facing each other and the space between them is less than 24 n miles. In this case, the Law of the Sea Convention proposes the application of the principle of equidistance except where historical titles or special circumstances [12] are involved. That is the case for the Greek islands facing the Turkish coast, particularly Lesbos, Samos, Chios and the Dodecanese islands including Rhodes, as well as—more to the East—the island of Megisti (Castellorizo) situated in front of the Turkish city of Kas. The two countries seem to agree on this point.
Delimitation of the continental shelf
This begins where the territorial waters end, so its extent is based on the breadth of the territorial waters, whether this is 3, 6 or 12 n miles. The Turkish claims (made in 1973 and 1974) begin beyond 6 n miles of the territorial waters of Greece, but since that date international law (Montego Bay Convention) accepts a maximal breadth of 12 n miles without restriction. There are four zones, with different characteristics :
. North of the Aegean Sea : there is an area of high sea beyond 12 n miles measured from the islands of Limnos, Hagios Eustratos, Lesbos, Scyros and Psara. Turkey could claim the entire zone on the basis of the decision of June 1977 (the Channel Islands ‘landlocked’ within the French continental shelf) but Greece could assert that the circumstances are different, since the space is much more limited than in the Channel or the Bay of Granville. The creation of a Joint Development Area [13]could partly satisfy the claims of both parties, determination of the sharing of benefits being the most delicate aspect. [14] Jurisdiction on the continental shelf may be distinct from jurisdiction on the water column (EEZ).
. Central Zone (off the Gulf of Kusadasi) : the proposals for the Northern Zone could apply to the area beyond 12 n miles of each country (creation of a Joint Development Area–see map).
. Southern Zone (between the Cyclades and Dodecanese) : Turkey claims a narrow space starting at 6 n miles from the Cyclades and Dodecanese. The implementation of 12 n miles in this area would leave small pockets of non-exploitable high seas that the principle of equity seems to allot to Greece, the total freedom of navigation for warships being guaranteed in this zone by the creation of an international corridor 3 to 5 n miles wide.
. Area between Rhodes and Megisti : the right of these two islands to territorial waters of 12 n miles cannot be questioned, the maritime space being large enough. The assignment of jurisdiction on the continental shelf and the water column (EEZ) is, however, debatable for Megisti because of the disproportional length of the coastline. [15]This disproportion is less obvious in the case of Rhodes but, due to its location, the full application of the median line for the delimitation of the continental shelf and of the EEZ could be unfair for Turkey and could justify a limited application for Rhodes.
The exclusive economic zone
Greece could freely extend its EEZ in all other areas of the Aegean Sea situated beyond 12 n miles. One may also consider separating the exercise of jurisdiction on the continental shelf from that of the EEZ. The jurisprudence on the ‘natural extension of the territory under the sea’ being applicable only to the continental shelf, Greece might claim jurisdiction on the water column above the Joint Development Areas. However, the delimitation in the Mediterranean (south-east of Rhodes) should follow that of the continental shelf. [16] The international corridor could be given an international status but some competences such as anti-pollution control of commercial ships could be given either to Greece, since this corridor touches on its 12 n miles, or to both countries, or to another entity to be determined.
The Contiguous Zone
A coastal state may carry out checks to ‘prevent infringements of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea’ in an area of 24 n miles measured from its baselines, that is to say up to 12 n miles outside the external limit of its territorial waters. In the Aegean Sea the two states could exercise this right within the limits fixed above, with the exception of the Joint Development Areas and the corridor.
In 1993 the European Council determined the so-called ‘Copenhagen criteria’, making it possible to evaluate Turkey’s progress in preparation for membership. These criteria included in particular ‘its determination to solve eventual border controversy in conformity with the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes as stipulated in the United Nations Charter, including, if applicable, the recognition of the authority of the International Court of Justice.’ The framework of negotiations, determined by the Intergovernmental Conference of 3 October 2005, opened following the decision to begin negotiations in December 2004, confirms these criteria. It is also specified that during the period prior to possible membership, Turkey shall progressively align its positions with those of the EU in international organizations, which logically implies its adherence to the Montego Bay Convention.
This is a difficult element in the negotiations of which we cannot foresee the outcome. Turkey’s membership of the EU would imply a radical change in its conceptions with regard the Law of the Sea and its recognition of the authority of the International Court of Justice. The jurisprudence of the Court is not necessarily against the positions of Ankara, particularly on the continental shelf, but Turkey should drop its claims regarding the breadth of territorial waters. Another solution would involve voluntary arrangements of this rule in the context of a bilateral agreement or an ad hoc arbitration after determination of mutually agreed parameters which might take into account the suggestions made in this article.
Copyright February 2009-Ortolland/Défense nationale et sécurité collective.
Défense nationale et sécurité collective is a publication whose purpose is to tackle all—national and international—political, economic, social and scientific issues by considering them from the viewpoint of defence. This specific aspect enabled it to outlive WW II and later on all the crises, hardships and regime changes that followed. Its readers in France all still share a common interest in defence and security, despite any differences in opinion, origins or political sensitivity. See
[1] The Treaty of Lausanne of 24 July 1923 questioned the Treaty of Sèvres of 10 August 1920 which had amputated the former Ottoman Empire of its Arab provinces, Anatolian Armenia and Eastern Thrace and the region of Smyrna (Izmir). After Lausanne, the Arab regions of the Middle East remained under the mandate of France and the United Kingdom, but Turkey received the region of Smyrna and Eastern Thrace.
[2] The Dodecanese islands (Rhodes and neighbouring islands) were ceded by Turkey to Italy by the Treaty of London in May 1913. The Treaty of Paris of 10 February 1947 placed the islands under the sovereignty of Athens.
[3] Adoption of the Convention on the Continental Shelf and the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.
[4] The issue on the size of territorial waters has consequences on the airspace, which in general covers the territorial waters. Athens considers that its airspace measures 10 n miles wide around its territory but Ankara only recognizes 6 n miles. A number of incidents have taken place during control operations of the airspace. Two Greek and Turkish fighter aircraft collided in May 2006.
[5] Article 6.2 of the Convention on the Continental Shelf dated 29 April 1958.
[6] Decision of 19 December 1978 : the International Court of Justice declared itself incompetent considering reservations of Greece on the jurisdiction of the International Permanent Court of Justice (which had preceded the ICJ) for the ‘issues related to the territorial status of Greece’.
[7] Turkey claims in effect that Greece can exercise sovereignty only on the islands that have been nominally ceded by the Treaties and questions the sovereignty of Athens on the islet of Imia/Kardak and on the island of Gavdos. This claim was formulated only in 1995.
[8] See in particular Didier Ortolland and Jean-Pierre Pirat, Atlas Géopolitique des espaces maritimes (Courbevoie : Technip, 2008).
[9] It is also the case of Sweden and Denmark for the Danish straits and of Chile for the strait of Le Maire.
[10] The trade of hydrocarbon raises the risk to the environment : importance of the transit via Bosporus (70 million tons per year) and the forthcoming opening of the Bourgas-Alexandroupolis pipeline, which will allow the transport of 35 million tons more starting in 2009 and 50 million tons thereafter.
[11] It is worth noting that Turkey,is not against the principle of a 12 n miles width, as it applies it in the Mediterranean Sea, off Cyprus.
[12] Montego Bay Convention, Art. 15.
[13] Turkey had suggested recourse to this type of arrangement in the 1970s.
[14] There is no rule in this matter ; many agreements provide for an equal, others an unequal, sharing of revenues.
[15] The surface area of Megisti is only 12 sq. km and the island has 430 inhabitants ; the ratio of the length of the coastline is favourable to Turkey.
[16] Turkey, which protested in March 2004 against the negotiation of an agreement on the maritime delimitation between Egypt and Cyprus, seems to claim an area reaching beyond the equidistant in the area.
Some comments by “En krypto”:
1. It is important that the author accepts specific Greek positions that are disputed by Turkey, including the right of the Greek islands on having territorial waters at 12 nautical miles, continental shelf and EEZ. It is also important that the entire continental shelf area between Thassos, Samothrace and Lemnos are given to Greece. Furthermore, the proposed solution has as direct consequence the significant expansion of the Greek air space at 12 nautical miles (except for “corridors”) without allowing Turkey to challenge that as it does today (as it will bridge the gap of by 6 nm territorial waters and 10 miles national airspace). It is also interesting that the author examines the Turkish theory of “gray zones” only as footnote (rather evaluating them as not so important) and do not take them into account in the proposed solution.
2. The author also accepts specific Turkish positions such as claims on continental shelf areas west of the Greek islands (on the basis of the Turkish argument that the islands are deposited on the continental shelf of Asia Minor) and refuses the right of the continental shelf and EEZ for Kastellorizo. In these matters, obviously Greece has counter arguments, but the author’s position is based on jurisprudence of the International Court in The Hague and is important for the Greek side to be aware of the difficulty to disprove the Turkish positions.
3. The demand for “free corridor” for Turkish warships (with the status of international waters) through Greek territorial waters, is unjustified. International law provides for the concept of “innocent passage” under which warships can pass through the territorial waters of another country – and the fact that Turkey already uses that to perform the well know visits near the western Greek islands of Andros and Kea in the Aegean is a good proof of it. So it is not clear what restrictions can be imposed if Greece has the sovereignty of these “corridors”, though probably this point is influenced by the requirements of other, powerful states for free navigation of their military vessels.

Hellenic National Pavilion at SOFEX 2012 – Jordan



DEFENSYS organised the Hellenic National Pavilion at the 9th Special Operations Forces Exhibition (SOFEX 2012), which was held under the Royal Patronage of His Majesty King Abdullah II, the Chairmanship of HRH Prince Feisal Bin Al Hussein and with the full support of the Jordan Armed Forces, between the 8th and 10th May 2012. in Amman, Jordan.
The Hellenic National Pavilion was organised with the full support of the General Directorate for Defence Investment and Armaments (GDDIA)/ Hellenic Ministry of National Defence. Six defence industries exhibited at SOFEX 2012, alongside DEFENSYS, namely HELLENIC AEROSPACE INDUSTRY, HELLENIC DEFENCE SYSTEMS, HELLENIC VEHICLE INDUSTRY, ELMON, PYRGOS, SIELMAN.
The Hellenic companies, which aim at promoting their defence products and services, as well as enhancing their international activities and boosting their exports, had the opportunity to meet with the leadership of the host country, the King of Jordan Abdullah II, the Prince Feisal Bin Al Hussein, the Prince Hamzah Bin Al Hussein, the Chief of National Defence General Staff, the Chief of Army General Staff, the Chief of Air Force Staff, the Jordanian Chief of Police, the Directors of Air Defence, Communications and Defence Procurement, but also with numerous high-ranking foreign Governmental and Armed Forces Delegations, as well as professional trade visitors.
This was the first time that a Hellenic National Pavilion was organised in a defence exhibition, a very significant and successful effort by DEFENSYS at a time when Greek companies are looking outward as a counteract to the effects of the economic crisis.
Defensys Stand
Officers from the Hellenic MoD/GDDIA with pilots from the Jordanian Airforce who graduated from the “IKARON” Academy.
His Majesty King Abdullah II visiting the Hellenic National Pavilion at SOFEX 2012.
His Royal Highness Prince Hamzah Bin Al Hussein conversing with the Chairman of the Hellenic Aerospace Industry, Mr. Tassos Filippakos, at SOFEX 2012.
High-ranking delegation during its visit to the stand of Hellenic Vehicle Industry.
One of the numerous delegations from the Ministry of Defence of Jordan which visited the Hellenic National Pavilion at SOFEX 2012.
High-ranking delegation visiting the Hellenic National Pavilion at SOFEX 2012
Source: helexpo.gr

FYROM’s NATO membership not on Chicago agenda



Despite a painstaking diplomatic campaign by the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), the issue of the Balkan country’s possible NATO membership will not be on the agenda of the organization’s two-day summit starting on Sunday in Chicago, reports said Friday.
Earlier this week, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that accession negotiations with the former Yugoslav republic will start once there is a mutually acceptable solution to the country’s name dispute with Greece.
Meeting with Greek President Karolos Papoulias this week, Greek party leaders agreed Athens should stick with its veto policy should the issue be brought up by the allies.
Greece will be represented at the summit by Foreign Minister Petros Molyviatis and Defense Minister Fragos Fragoulis, both members of the recently-appointed caretaker cabinet.
The military alliance’s strategy in Afghanistan will be the main agenda item for the Chicago summit.

U.S.: Ratification of the Law of the Sea, what does it mean for Greece?



Top U.S. defense leaders asked the Senate to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), because any further delay in the ratification by the U.S. side costs in geo-economic and geopolitical level.
The UNCLOS treaty which is the result of the third session of the UN on the issue (UNCLOS III), and took place from 1973 to 1982 and was signed at Montego Bay, Jamaica among other things provides for the adoption of the institution of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). This treaty has been active since 1994 and despite the fact that it was signed by the U.S., the Senate has not yet ratified it.
So far a small group of Republicans oppose the ratification of the treaty on the grounds that the U.S. will surrender sovereignty to hydrocarbons found in American continental shelf. According to the Secretary of Defense, Leon Panetta, the ratification is supported by major U.S. industries, oil, energy, shipbuilding, shipping, and communications companies.
L. Panetta emphasized that the industry believes that the UNCLOS provides the legal framework of stability for a prospective business environment and the same applies to the field of national security.
Gen. Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that the adoption of UNCLOS in fact assists the U.S. strategic goals in areas such as Asia, particularly in the context of China’s naval deterrence in the region. According to the U.S. official the treaty allows for a strong naval presence in the South China Sea.
By opposing the treaty, the U.S. are losing “credibility” because, as noted by L. Panetta “how can we argue that other nations must abide by international rules when we haven’t officially accepted those rules ourselves?”.
In addition, this treaty will help, a maritime nation like the U.S., enforce sea lanes, which is a priority for Washington specifically in the area of the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran has threatened to block. According to Panetta, the ratification of the treaty will allow the U.S. to strengthen the feeling of freedom of navigation and would “isolate Iran, as one of the few remaining non-parties to the convention.”
In case of non-ratification of the treaty, the U.S. will continue to operate in the seas of the world based on customary international law, which can change to their own detriment. Customary law is used as a tool by foreign countries which at times seek to obstruct the free navigation, so the big victim are aircraft carriers and ships of the largest naval force in the world, i.e. the USA.
Finally, L. Panetta added that the adoption of UNCLOS would allow the U.S. to increase the legal and economic control over a huge area of 200 nautical miles from its shores.
As it can be understood, this development could be crucial to the U.S. policy towards what is happening in the Eastern Mediterranean and dictate a policy to be followed in our region. As rightly emphasized by L. Panetta it is not possible to push countries around the world to abide to the international law, while the U.S. are not adopting it.
So the U.S. may be primarily interested in Southeast Asia, due to China’s increasing naval presence which has developed an ambitious naval strategy, including the construction of aircraft carriers, but the fact is that this development will also affect the Eastern Mediterranean which hosts not China, but a country that thinks it can behave like… China, namely Turkey.
From our side we should underline that Greece – the largest maritime trading power on the planet – has every interest in supporting these developments in the U.S. – the largest naval military power in the world – for a range of geopolitical, geo-economic and energy reasons.
The issue of the EEZ is not a “fashion” and / or “populism” as some of its opponents claim in Greece. There is a developing favorable situation for the Greek national interests in the Eastern Mediterranean where the exploitation of hydrocarbon resources is a part – at least – of the solution to the economic problem of the country, and no one in Greece should jeopardize these developments.

Ideological Identity and Geostrategic Deadlocks of the “New” Turkey


by Christos Minagias, Brigadier General of Hellenic Armed Forces Geostrategic Analyst, Athens, Greece
The regional policy of Turkey, aiming at filling the power vacancies in the Middle East, especially highlighted its military power causing great concern to all of the neighbor states. This fact, in combination with the cultural and economic infiltration attempted by the Turkish side, grew even bigger concerns and as a result, oppositions to the Turkish expansionist policy, along with the, obvious or backstage, highly important participation of the Great Powers.
The ideological identity of the “New” Turkey
The new Constitution that Tayyip Erdogan promised to the Turkish people, will be at the same time the ideological identity of the “New” Turkey. Erdogan was the big winner of the elections held on the 12th of June 2011 as the Turkish voters, on the one hand appreciated his zeal, vision and ambition, while at the same time they search at his face for the stability as they don’t have any alternatives. Furthermore, the results of the research held by the Vice-President of the government Besir Atalay, revealed a special singularity concerning the ideological synthesis of the electorate that supported Erdogan. More specifically, out of the 21.466.356 voters who voted for the AK Party (AKP), 27.1% belong to the conservative islamists, 24.4% to the Turkish nationalists, 16.4% to the Atatürk-Kemalist supporters, 7.2% to the social democrats, 5.9% to the liberals democrats, 3% to the neo-nationalists and 1.4% belong to the Kurdish nationalists.
The basic orientation of the AKP is directly related to the Turkish nationalism. That is, AKP is a nationalist party, which inside feeds Islamism and represents the Turkish-islamism or Turkish-islamic synthesis (Türk-İslam sentezi). It is widely known in Turkey that in 1991, the vision of the Turkish-Islamism opened the road for the power on Erbakan, and now defends and supports Erdogan. The basic principle of this ideology refers to the elevation of Turkism through Islamism, and it had on its side the militarism, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the islamists, including the Gülen movement.
When Erdogan came to power in 2002, the Generals realized that the islamist prime minister, along with the support of the Gülen movement, poses a threat against the political establishment, and planned many times to topple him, without success.
Turkish analysts believe that Erdogan’s party after succeeding in isolating the Generals, by putting an end on the military emancipation, has already taken over the assignment of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli. MHP used to conduct its strangle with conflicts in the streets, while AKP with a highly professional and flexible way, as firstly it managed to handle the economy of the country and later took over the assignment of the nationalists. More precisely, it managed to successfully put together the Islamism with the Turkism and as a result to fill the gap that the deficit of MHP had created in the Turkish society.
So, the AKP is a new liberalized, nationalist and Turkish-Islamic party, which at the same time managed to push out of the limelight the other two components of the Turkish-islamic synthesis, the army and the MHP party. In addition, it is not a coincidence that after the elections of the 12th of June 2011, Erdogan promoted Cemil Çiçek at the position of the president of the national assembly, who represents the Turkish-islamism at the government of AKP. It must be underlined that, before 1980, Çiçek, formed a part of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and afterwards went over to the Motherland Party (ANAP) of Turgut Özal. Later, when Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gül founded the AKP party and took over the power of the country in 2002, Çiçek played a key role in the relations between the conservative nationalist basis of the party and the State.
Turkish-islamism and Gülen movement
The Fethullah Gülen movement constitutes a nationalist socio-economic movement under the cloak of religion. Its basic purpose is to secure, promote and show off the Turkish nationalism, while the security and promotion of Islam is a matter of second priority.
A Turk, in order to be considered nationalist, should love his country and language, while his thoughts, feelings and actions must protect and promote the Turkism. The ideological pedestal of the Gülen movement proceeds from the ideology of Turkish-islamism, given that the movement uses that particular ideology aiming at showing off the domination of the Turks. So, under this point of view the Gülen movement could be characterized as a new version of the Turkish-islamist policy, that some Turks analysts call ottoman-turkish synthesis (Osmanlı-Türk sentezi).
In Turkey, there are almost 20 religion communities (Cemaat and Tarikat). The Islamic Gülen movement and the community İskender Paşa Cemaati are among them. Tayyip Erdoyan does not come from the Islamic Gülen movement, but belongs to the İskender Paşa Cemaati having as spiritual guides Zahit Koktu and Esat Coşan. This cemaat supported Erdogan’s party during all of the election confrontations, except from the elections of the 12th of June 2011, when, through a public announcement he made on the 2nd of June 2011, called its followers not to vote for AKP, but to support the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli.
The Gülen movement supports Erdogan because it thinks that through this policy will, on the one hand, consolidate and strengthen, while at the same time its party cadres will be able to become richer and be placed in key positions in the Turkish state. The strategy of the Gülen movement is versatile and moves towards the following fields of action:
  • Complete penetration and control of the strategic command centers and governing of the country.
  • Development and promotion of the social relations through the penetration into the Presidency of Religious Affairs, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health.
  • Penetration into the state media and use of the newspapers, magazines and the other television and radio stations that has under his control, as political-ideological organs of his movement.
  • Taking over the control of the strategic economic centers of the country, such as the Ministry of Finance, the undersecretary of Treasury, the State Planning Organizations, etc.
  • Penetration into the Turkish security forces, such as the police, the Gendarmerie General Command and the armed forces, laying special stress on the police academies.
The Islamists and the Kurdish problem in Turkey
The Kurdish problem constitutes the major problem for Turkey, which affects not only the domestic but the foreign policy of the country as well. More specifically, under the possibility of toppling the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad, the interest of Turkey is focused on the Kurds of Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Iran, who provoke fear syndrome to Ankara in case they collaborate with each other and decide the foundation of an independent Kurdish state. As a result of this fear syndrome, the Kurdish revolt confronts a violent attack from the Turkish-islamic mechanism through the assassinations of guerillas and non-combatants or through the arrests of Kurds not only in the interior of the country, but also in North Iraq and in European countries.
The Turkish-islamic spirit of Erdogan, after eliminating the kemalist ideology in the army and the Justice, is willing to take further steps concerning the Kurdish problem and the stratocracy, that no other Turkish government has ever made in the past.
Meanwhile, if we take into account that in Turkey, almost all of the “religionists-islamists” are nationalists as well, serious doubts are raised, whether a nationalist party, like AKP is proved to be, will be able to solve the Kurdish problem.
The basic policy applied by all of the Turkish governments, including Erdogan’s policy, in order to solve the Kurdish problem, was the assimilation of the Kurds. Especially during the last two years, the government of AKP is using the Gülen movement, that constitutes the “deep state” of the Islamic governing of the country, as a new psychological weapon for the stamping of PKK and the assimilation of the Kurdish population, through the creation of schools, Sunday Schools and religious organizations from the network of the mentioned Imam. After all, this is the basic reason why the Kurdish movement during the pre-election period proceeded to the so-called “religious disobedience” asking from its members not to go for prayer to the mosques, but to other places with Kurdish Imams.
The Turkish Generals took the military measures at their face value, a strategy that not only did not come up to their expectations but also was proved completely ineffective at the confrontation of the threat of 4.500 guerillas, from whom 3.000 are in North Iraq and the rest 1.500 take action in Turkey. That is why the Erdogan’s government decided to confide the control of the operations to the police and the Gendarmerie General Command, reinforced of course by the armed forces and MIT. It has already been decided the assignement of a more active role to the Police Special Operation Forces with an increase of their manpower from 6.618 to 11.000 members by the end of 2015. At the same time, a “Special Forces” unit was set up, composed of 300 police officers and gendarmerie officers, with main mission the conduct of operations in the interior and the exterior (North Iraq, Syria, USA, EU, etc) of Turkey, in order to arrest or assassinate leading cadres of the Kurdish revolt and ex-cadres that have stepped out. The purpose of these operations is to provoke military and psychological problems to the Kurds, while the doctrine of their conduct is mainly based on the operation of arrest of the Kurd Şemdin Sakık by Turkish Special Forces (Maroon Berets) in North Iraq in 1998.
From the Turkish Generals to the political dictatorship of the mild Islam
Turkish analysts are of the opinion that, the examination procedure that is in progress, concerning the military coups and interventions in the political life of the country, created the impression that an opposition to the Ataturkism is attempted. The same analysts also warn the Prime Minister Erdogan that this is a discredit, devoid of substance and a contention which insults, humiliates and even directly vilifies the memory of Ataturk.
The Turkish public opinion, despite the fact that is aware of the intentions of the governing party of AKP to create a conservative Turkey, has supported Erdogan in all the previous election confrontations. It still, though, remains opposite and will resist dynamically to the idea of the establishment of a theocratic governing system in the country. On this subject, the Turk journalist Mehmet Ali Birand, who has supported through his journalism the reforms of the islamist prime minister, stated that if the political leadership of the country aim at establishing a theocratic regime, then it will not be necessary for the army to get out of the camps, as all of us, the civilians, who are on the alert in order to secure our society-democratic system, will go out on the streets.
When in 2002 the AKP party came to power, over the military establishment as well as in a large part of the Turkish public opinion, the fear for the establishment of an Islamic state reigned. But it was exactly when a new fear made its appearance: it was the fear of the despotic power and the governing of the country with a high-handed manner. As a matter of fact, the Turks begun to wonder, whether, under the pretence of the democratization of the country, the military emancipation was replaced by a political dictatorship and a turk-islamic nationalist regime.
For the following nine years, the leadership of AKP was misleading the Turkish people, promising to bring democracy in the country, while what they were actually doing was establishing their despotic islamic regime. This is what confirms the perception that Turkey is a country with endemic issues, and neither their military establishment nor their government are to be trusted. And that is due to two reasons:
  • First of all, because of the fact that their military establishment, in order not to lose their vested power, planned the toppling of the Erdogan government creating in the Turkish society a fear feeling through terrorist actions, influencing the public opinion with the holding of psychological operations and provoking a conflict crisis with Greece. It is also worth mentioning, that while the investigatory procedure is in progress and hundreds of military officers have been remanded in custody on a charge of preparing a coup, the deep military establishment, in every given chance, is present and threatens the traitors who imprisoned their colleagues.
  • Secondly, because, apart from the effort of overthrow and demystification of the military elite, the autocracy of Erdogan expanded not only on his political rivals, but also on a large section of journalists. It is widely known that 105 journalists and 35 employees in newspapers are in prison for “making the mistake” of expressing their opinion freely and criticizing AKP and the Gülen movement, which supports Erdogan. While the Turkish public opinion thinks of Erdogan as the most successful political leader with a percentage of 45%, his party is limited only to 36,5%. Moreover, another important clue is the fact that, among the institutions that the Turks trust the most, the army is placed first with 59,9%, followed by the police with 52,7%, the President of Democracy with 48,3%, the non-governmental organizations with 40,6%, the Justice with 38,8%, the national assembly with 36,5%, the education with 28,3%, the political parties with 25% and last the media with a percentage of 22,1%. By this analysis, it is made quite clear that in case Erdogan retires from politics, most likely because of the health problems he is dealing with, the political scene will radically change. Especially, if they don’t come up with a solution to the Kurdish problem and if there are negative developments for Turkey in Eastern Mediterranean, the stratocracy will not disappear and possibly those issues will be its return ticket to the previous regime.
It is obvious that, what was just mentioned, hit directly the image of Turkey, given that there is a certain contradiction: through the exposure of the “deep state”, the Ergenekon trial and the relations between the army and the political power, Erdogan wants to demonstrate that he has a political vision and determination, while at the same time, the Turk prime minister, through another deeply islamic mechanism, governs the country via despotism, has put limits at the freedom of expression and shows no sensitivity at all when it comes to resolving the Kurdish problem.
The geostrategic deadlocks of “New” Turkey
Turkey, on its effort to be entrusted with a regional and partly international role so to be part of the planning of the new international scene, incorporated, in its already overcharged sector of national security, dangers and threats that other countries face. This is fully imprinted on Davutoğlu’s policy revulsion from having zero problems to creating multiple problems with Syria, Iran, Iraq, Armenia, Israel, Greece, Cyprus even Azerbaijan.
After the beginning of the “Arab Spring” revolts in Middle East and North Africa, the discussions whether Turkey is the “model country” for the reformation of the countries in this particular geographical department, were intensified. However, because of the posture of cautiousness by the leaderships of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Turkish strategy changed direction and since, focuses on the keystone of Erdogan’s elevation as the “model leader”, bringing out, especially, his open opposition with Israel.
During the past few years, Turkey applies an energy policy in Middle East and the Arabic world, whose basic characteristic is the ideological approach to the choices of the opposition parties of those countries and the excessive approach to Hamas, Hezbollah, Muslim Brotherhood etc. It should also be mentioned, that the islamic government of AKP’s strategy tried to take advantage of the Mavi Marmara incident in order to convert into a multifarious problem with intervention right of third and external factors like Hamas, Egypt, Hezbollah, Iran even Syria, while the “Arab Spring” revolts were still in progress. This policy may lead to temporary profit for Turkey, but it will also provoke serious dangers in the future.
As far as the happenings in the Middle East are concerned, Ankara neither can compete nor stand up against the power of Israel. It just maintains a deterrent posture in the face of the energy developments in Eastern Mediterranean and the collaboration axis between Israel-Cyprus-Greece. Erdogan’s government noticing that Cyprus and Israel will not shift their grounds, put into practice the strategy of challenging, seeking to militarize the issues concerning the energy sources by creating grey zones, and to raise, at the same time, through propaganda, the feeling of insecurity to foreign investors and companies that do not fall in with his views.
For the Turks the senses of defense and security, apart from their military dimension, contain a context of political, economical, legal, social, psychological, technological and geographical interests as well, that are evaluated and upgraded all the time. Moreover, when the Turks evaluate the national power data of their rivals, they lay extra weight on the economic power, while during the evaluation of the military power, besides the number of the arming systems, they also take into consideration their quality, their modernity, the possible targets they will hit and their use by a leadership with influence and determination. Nevertheless, the deadlocks of the “strategic depth” policy followed by the Foreign Affairs minister, Davutoğlu, the revision of the Constitution without any previous experience on the function of such an important democratic procedure, Erdogan’s rift with the Generals and the weaknesses of the armed forces to face the PKK-KCK and generally the Kurdish revolt, are significant factors that remarkably detract the Turkish national power.
It should be particularly evaluated the ideological distribution of the governing party voters in Turkey, as it turns up that in their vast majority they are nationalists and Atatürk-Kemalist supporters. Maybe this is the main reason why the Turk Prime Minister has significantly raised the nationalist tones not only on the Kurdish problem but also on the rest of the regional issues the country is dealing with.
While the Davutoğlu’s policy deadlocks are more than obvious, the Turkish-islamic mechanism of Fethullah Gülen’s movement urges the Prime Minister Erdogan to get over the “intoxication of the power” and not to lead the country into a conflict with Israel. Especially, in a period of time during which the threats are multidimensional and possibly not easy to deal with. After all, every single imminent failure of Erdogan’s policy, concerning the main issues, like the Kurdish and the Cyprus problem, will cause a severe reaction of the Turkish public opinion as a whole, that could even lead to unexpected political developments.
Concluding, is to be noticed that, the Turkish diplomacy, under the flag of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu’s “strategic depth”, is trying to mislead the neighbor states, supporting that its strategy does not contain any imperialist intentions, but aims at a peaceful partnership with the region. Nevertheless, the transformation of the zero problems policy into a policy of gaining the maximum profit possible out of their neighbors, showed clearly to everyone that, on the one hand, the Turkish way of thinking has remained unfading throughout the years, while at the same time, the turk-islamic nationalism is oriented towards every possible direction, east, west, north and south.